Is it Game, Set, Match on the NCAA's Amateurism and Prize Money Bylaws after NCAA v. Alston?

Blog Post | 112 KY. L. J. ONLINE | February 20, 2024

Is it Game, Set, Match on the NCAA’s Amateurism and Prize Money Bylaws after NCAA v. Alston?

By: Tate Craft, Staff Editor, Vol. 112 

In August 2023, Fiona Crawley, then the top-ranked NCAA Division 1 women’s tennis player, made an impressive run through singles’ qualifying at the U.S. Open, catapulting her into the main draw.[1] Despite losing in the first round of women’s singles and doubles, Crawley was entitled to $92,500 in prize money—$81,500 from singles and $11,000 from split earnings with her doubles partner.[2] While it may have been a rush to compete at the U.S. Open, the excitement of receiving a prize money payout would soon end for Crawley.[3] Per National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) bylaws, NCAA tennis players must forfeit any prize money earned over $10,000, except what is used for necessary expenses, or risk losing their remaining collegiate eligibility.[4] Knowing this, Crawley relinquished her U.S. Open winnings to ensure she could finish her senior season at UNC.[5] Crawley’s story does not exist in isolation,[6] but it has reinvigorated requests for the NCAA to review its amateurism bylaws, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston.

In 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the NCAA’s appeal from the Ninth Circuit ruling, which struck down NCAA rules capping education-related benefits schools may offer student-athletes as a violation of antitrust laws.[7] In its writ for certiorari, the NCAA sought “immunity from the normal operation of the antitrust laws” and approval of its “existing restraints” on education-related benefits receivable by students.[8]

To determine the antitrust concerns, the Court utilized a three-prong rule of reason analysis: (1) the plaintiff must show a “substantial anticompetitive effect;” (2) the defendant must establish a “procompetitive rationale for the restraint;” and (3) “the plaintiff must demonstrate the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.”[9] In sum, the Court found in favor of the plaintiffs—stating that the NCAA’s restraints were “inexplicably stricter than necessary” and in violation of antitrust laws.[10]

In the fallout from the Supreme Court’s ruling, the NCAA relieved its restrictions on student-athletes’ ability to profit off their name, image, and likeness (NIL), which are inherently protected by antitrust laws.[11] The NCAA quickly implemented an interim NIL policy, allowing students to profit from their personal brand.[12] Interestingly, the NCAA refused to promulgate its own NIL guidelines association-wide.[13] Instead, the organization delegated this task to state legislatures, leaving the status of NIL policies asymmetrical.[14] In January 2024, the NCAA Division I Council adopted proposals intended to protect student-athletes engaging in NIL deals including requirements for: voluntary registration, disclosure, standardized contracts, and comprehensive NIL education.[15] While the ability to engage in NIL contracts is a win for NCAA student-athletes, the framework’s nature allows some to turn intense profits, while others fail to reap the benefits, especially those playing non-revenue generating sports such as tennis.[16] 

Like the plaintiffs in Alston, the student-athletes making upwards of millions of dollars from NIL contracts are largely men’s basketball and football players[17]—programs which generate the most revenue.[18] Student-athletes engaging in non- or low-revenue generating sports do not receive massive NIL deals due to a lack of spotlight and reduced resources.[19] This, in turn, creates a fairness and antitrust issue: why are certain athletes able to turn intense profits off NIL contracts, while others cannot collect prize money they have earned? The answer to this complication may arise from the NCAA’s revisitation of its current amateurism rule, especially in programs, like tennis, where the institution carves out an exception to its prize money rules.[20]

In Alston, the Supreme Court visited discussions of the NCAA’s conceptualization of amateurism.[21] While the Court was not resolving the debate surrounding amateurism, the concept was raised as part of the organization’s procompetitive justification for restraints on student-athlete compensation, which they insist preserves amateurism.[22] The NCAA argues that the district court should have “deferred its conception of amateurism” instead of recharacterizing its “product.”[23] The Court notes that a restraint is not immune from Sherman Act violations simply because an organization labels it a product feature.[24] The district court found that it could not defer to the NCAA’s conceptualization of amateurism because its definition was inconsistent and had a quick turnaround.[25] Therefore, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding, finding that this case is a “straightforward application of the rule of reason.”[26] Interestingly, the Court concluded by saying that the national debate surrounding amateurism in college sports is important, and some believe this to be the beginning of the end for the NCAA’s amateurism policies.[27] With that, prize money bylaws might soon follow as they fall under the amateurism conceptual umbrella.

Even if the NCAA’s amateurism policy goes unscathed, there are other alternatives to restructuring the prize money framework that would allow college tennis players to receive payouts for their performances in professional tournaments. Following Fiona Crawley’s decision to forfeit her prize money, Nate Wood, UNC’s associate athletic director for NCAA compliance, provided a possible solution to the issue.[28] Wood’s proposal includes creating infrastructure within the NCAA’s amateurism bylaws that mirror the Olympic Gold Grant program.[29] Currently, the Olympic Gold Grant allows student-athletes to receive payouts from the United States Olympic Committee based on their performances in the Olympics and Olympic Trials while maintaining their collegiate eligibility.[30] To implement this program, the NCAA would be required to make similar agreements with institutions like the International Tennis Federation (ITF), Women’s Tennis Association (WTA), and the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP), allowing student-athletes participating in these sanctioned events to retain their prize money without running afoul of amateurism bylaws.

While current NCAA tennis players like Fiona Crawley may not be able to fully reap the benefits of their hard work and performance in professional tournaments, future student-athletes may find themselves in a better position. With the Court’s eye on amateurism and the NCAA’s loosened restrictions on student-athlete profits, there exists a path for the destabilization of the NCAA’s amateurism rules, allowing these players to invest in their futures through performance payouts.

[1] Caroline Wills, Fiona Crawley, UNC Tennis Players Struggle with NCAA Prize Money Rules, Daily tar heel (Sept. 27, 2023, 11:33 PM), https://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2023/09/sports-tennis-prize-money-regulations-in-college-fiona-crawley-us-open-tar-heels-north-carolina-collegiate-womens-tennis.

[2] Linsey Davis, College tennis champ Fiona Crawley explains decision to forfeit US Open prize money, ABC News (Sept. 6, 2023, 12:35 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/college-tennis-champ-fiona-crawley-explains-decision-forfeit/story?id=102929858.

[3] Wills, supra note 1.

[4]     Amateurism certification basics, tennis, Men’s and Womens, Ncaa Eligibility Center, (Summer 2019), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility_center/ECMIP/Amateurism_Certification/Amat_Tennis.pdf.

[5] Wills, supra note 1.

[6] Id.

[7] National College Athletic Assn. v. Alston, 141 S.Ct. 2141, 2144 (2021).

[8] Id. at 2147.

[9] Id. at 2160 (internal citations omitted).

[10] Id. at 2162.

[11] Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and Likeness Policy, NCAA (June 30, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/news/2021/6/30/ncaa-adopts-interim-name-image-and-likeness-policy.aspx.

[12] Laura C. Murray, The New Frontier of NIL Legislation, 60 Hous. L. Rev. 757, 757 (2023).

[13] Interim NIL Policy, NCAA (July 2021), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/NIL_InterimPolicy.pdf.

[14] Id.

[15] Meghan Durham Wright, Division I Council Approves NIL Disclosure and Transparency Rules, NCAA (Jan. 1, 2024, 7:56 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/news/2024/1/10/media-center-division-i-council-approves-nil-disclosure-and-transparency-rules.aspx.

[16] Aaron Beard, Non-revenue sports fret over college athlete compensation, Associated press (June 1, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://apnews.com/non-revenue-sports-fret-over-college-athlete-compensation-6e75887a2e44e6cca8bd55949504a937.

[17] National College Athletic Assn., 141 S.Ct. at 2141; Josh Tolle, Colordao’s Shedeur Sanders and Travis Hunter on ‘Top 10 Highest Paid’ NIL List, Sports Illustrated (Nov. 17, 2023, 7:47 PM), https://www.si.com/college/colorado/buffs-social/colorado-shedeur-sanders-and-travis-hunter-on-top-10-highest-paid-nil-list.

[18] Andrew Zimbalist, Analysis: Who is winning in the high-revenue world of college sports?, PBS (Mar. 18, 2023, 7:14 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/analysis-who-is-winning-in-the-high-revenue-world-of-college-sports.

[19] Beard, supra note 16.

[20] NCAA, 2023–2024 Manual, Const. art. 12.1.2.4.2 (2023).

[21] National College Athletic Assn., 141 S.Ct. at 2144.

[22] Id. at 2152.

[23] Id. at 2144.

[24] Id. at 2152.

[25] National College Athletic Assn., 141 S.Ct. at 2163.

[26] Id.

[27] Murray, supra note 12.

[28] Wills, supra note 1.

[29] Id.

[30] Steve Berkowitz, Olympics offer rare chance for NCAA athletes to be paid, USA Today (Aug. 2, 2016, 7:10      PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/rio-2016/2016/08/02/paying-ncaa-college-athletes-at-rio-olympics-kyle-snyder-katie-ledecky/87709714/.